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  Abstract  
 
Tariff water –the difference between bound and applied duties– provides relevant information on 
domestic trade policy and WTO trade negotiations. This paper examines the general and sectoral tariff 
structure of 120 economies, using exploratory data analysis. 
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Mapping the Tariff Waters 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Governments negotiate at the WTO the bound tariffs levels, i.e.  the maximum tariffs they are 
authorised to charge on other WTO members.  Countries differences in their bound levels as well as 
in applied tariffs under the most favoured nation principle (MFN) are most likely related to both their 
economic development and their national policies towards domestic protection and trade openness.  
To the extend that trade negotiations are reflected in these policies, analysing the existing tariff 
structures should expose any underlying negotiation strategies.   
 
The present study examines the hypothesis that the particular structure of bound and applied tariffs of 
a given country, reflects a series of trade policy decisions that are related to its economic development 
and reveals national authorities' protection standpoint towards the various economic sectors.  The 
analysis identifies the countries having similar overall structures across sectors, then analyses the 
specific patterns for each particular product sector.  Finally, the degree of influence of countries' 
socio-economic characteristics on their tariff structure is evaluated.  In doing so, the analysis takes 
into account that recently acceded members went through an accession process that was more 
demanding than previous GATT practices.   
 
The relative situation of applied and bound tariffs provides also information on the negotiation 
margins of each economy, as open economies (low applied duties) with low bounds have less margin 
at the negotiation table than open economies with high bounds.  Economies with high applied duties 
are in an intermediate situation as any reduction in the bound could cut the MFN applied and this may 
be resisted by domestic pressure groups.  In addition, some members are also allowed to keep some of 
their products unbound while others have fixed bound duties at economic pointless levels i.e., much 
above the prohibitive tariff (Foletti, Fugazza, Nicita and Olarreaga 2009).   
 Thus, a better understanding of the tariff structure can shed additional light on the strategies behind 
trade negotiations and the building up of coalitions (Costantini, Crescenzi, De Filippis and Salvatici 
2007). 
 
Mapping the tariff waters has gained an additional interest after September 2008, when the global 
crisis severely affected the international economy. 2 In such a crisis situation, it is feared that 
governments will look for uncooperative exit solutions typical of the "Prisoner Dilemma", running 
unilaterally their applied tariff within the bound commitments at the expense not only of their 
partners, but eventually of themselves and the international governance. 
 
After introducing the data and the statistical methodology, the study proceeds by exploring  the tariff 
data from a general to a sectoral perspective.  The fourth part explores the relationship between the 
tariffs structure and relevant socio-economic variables.  Finally, the conclusion summarises the main 
results.   
 
                                                     
2 In this paper, the term "tariff water" is used for the binding overhang, namely the difference between 
bound and MFN applied tariffs.  From a historical context, the expression was used, in a somewhat more 
restrictive connection, in the Uruguay Round negotiations when countries offered tariff equivalents that were 
obviously inflated (Goode 2003).  It should not be confused neither with the notion of "policy space" as many 
trade partners have concluded a series of regional or preferential trade agreements (PTA and RTA, respectively) 
that legally restrict their margin of manoeuvre. 
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II. THE TARIFF DATA  
A. SOURCES OF DATA AND PROCESSING  
The analysis covers 120 economies with the European Union 27 countries counting as one and 
Switzerland including Liechtenstein.  While only WTO Members are considered, some had to be 
excluded from the analysis due to lack of information.  The applied and bound duties are sourced 
from the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB) and the WTO Consolidated Tariff Schedules database 
(CTS).  The 2006 applied duties are considered; for 17 countries where this information is missing, 
the latest available year is considered.  Missing applied duties and ad valorem equivalents are sourced 
from the UNCTAD's TRAINS database and ITC's MAcMap database, discarding the outliers (e.g. ad 
valorem equivalents higher than 1000%). 
  
In order to obtain cross-country comparability, national tariff line duties are first aggregated up to the 
level of 6-digit HS sub-headings by calculating the simple average of included tariff lines.  The water 
between the bound and applied duty is calculated at the HS 6-digit level; for products where the 
applied duty is not available (0.4% of all observations), the water has been left missing.  Negative 
values of the water (3.5% of all observations) due to reporting errors, binding violations or 
inconsistencies in the calculation of ad valorem equivalents, are set to zero.  Unbound products 3 (21.3 
% of the observations) are considered sensitive for the economy; thus, the imputed water (at 6-digits) 
is set equal to the 3rd quartile of the water observed for similar products (same HS 4-digit products, or 
same HS 2-digit products when no 4-digit water is available).  For products where the water at the HS 
2-digit level is not available, the value has been left missing. 
 
To provide economically meaningful information, applied duties and water have been aggregated by 
sector by using simple averages, according to UNCTAD's 4 economic classification based on factor 
intensity.  This nomenclature regroups all HS products into 6 groups at the HS 4-digit level ( 
 
Table 1).   
 
Table 1: Product sectors by factor intensity   
 
Sector 
 
Description 
 
Typical products 
A Non-fuel primary commodities Agricultural products (fish included)  
B Resource-intensive manufactures Raw materials (aluminium, paper, leather, silk, etc.) 
C Low skill- and technology intensive manufactures Textiles and clothing 
D Medium skill- and technology intensive manufactures Organic and inorganic chemicals, rubber, machinery, cars 
E High skill- and technology intensive manufactures Pharmaceuticals and hi-tech products 
F Mineral fuels Coal, petroleum, other energy.   
 
Source: UNCTAD's economic classification based on factor intensity 
 
 
B. DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
In order to identify underlying patterns behind the large volume of data, a series of bottom-up 
procedures inspired by Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) are applied.  EDA seeks "connections" 
among complex multivariate data sets, without pretence of causality, that may help to formulate 
                                                     
3 and not available bound tariffs     
4 The original classification follows the HS96 nomenclature; it was also transposed into the HS92 and 
in HS02 in order to match all countries applied and bound duties. 
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statistical models to test.  Because bound, applied and binding overhang are related with a strict 
identity, the analysis focuses on applied tariff (the present situation) and the binding overhang (the 
tariff water).  5  The category F (Fuels) has been excluded, because it is (i) usually unrepresentative of 
national trade policy, (ii) particularly prone to measurement errors in notifications and interpretation, 
and (iii) plagued by many missing observations.   
 
A series of statistical techniques are implemented in the study.  Underlying similarities and 
dissimilarities between observations and variables are explored using clustering techniques in order to 
(i) develop a typology of objects; (ii) understand the conceptual classificatory function behind the 
typology; and (iii) formulate hypothesis about the data generation process.  6 Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) is used to identify the underlying multidimensional data structure.  PCA displays the 
data in a substantially reduced subspace of uncorrelated variables, that best preserves the statistical 
information (variance) contained in the original data.  7 Discriminatory analysis is applied in the end, 
with a view to verify whether the composition of the identified clusters during the analytical process 
could be linked to any trade policy or economic performance variables.   
  
 
III. EXPLORING THE TARIFF WATERS 
Adopting the time honoured "general to specific" statistical analysis, this section initiates with a 
global perspective, factoring-in all the tariff dimensions (sectors) into a common pattern, 
representative –at least in the tariff space– of each country's trade policy.  The second part is 
successively focusing on each one of the tariff policy dimensions (sectoral tariffs) to scale more 
precisely the tariff profile of each individual member. 
  
A. THE TARIFFS FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
The entire set of variables and observations is explored first, in order to provide some general 
descriptive information of the dataset and to identify any general underlying patterns across both 
products and countries.   
 
1. Descriptive statistics on tariffs  
Table 2 presents a set of descriptive statistics concerning the observed distribution of applied tariffs 
and the binding overhang.  Not surprisingly, the A category of agricultural products emerges almost 
immediately as an outlier: it spreads across a large interval and has the highest variance in both 
dimensions of applied and water. 
 
A box plot of agricultural data 8 reveals the presence of outliers for applied tariff duties, with the 
maximum lying far away from the normally expected range.  Aside from agriculture, the group D, of 
medium skill- and technology intensive manufactures (chemicals and cars), shows also an interesting 
distribution.  At the contrary of A, it is a very compact group, distributed much sharply and more 
concentrated than a normal Gauss distribution.  The distribution of applied tariffs in group C of low 
skills- and technology intensive manufactures (textiles and clothing) is the closest to normality, in our 
sample.  It is relatively symmetric, albeit flatter than the normal distribution.  Groups B and E come 
in-between the previous cases.   
 
                                                     
5 Dropping one of the variables is not only an editorial choice, but a mathematical necessity.  Because 
the three components are linearly dependent, they cannot be analysed jointly through most statistical procedures 
based on linear algebra.   
6 Testing those hypothesis belongs to "confirmatory data analysis", not covered here. 
7 PCA is similar to factor analysis, but it is more general (it works on the total variance of the 
observation and does not imply any underlying statistical model). 
8 Not published here; all the same, distribution patterns for individual variables can easily be inferred 
from Table 2 and  Figure 1.  
  5
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on applied MFN and binding overhang 
Variables: a 
Statistics: App_A App_B App_C App_D App_E Dif_A Dif_B Dif_C Dif_D Dif_E 
No.  of observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
No.  of missing values 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 54.2 30.0 29.3 30.5 31.2 148.2 115.7 115.0 119.5 116.8 
Freq.  of minimum 2.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Freq.  of maximum 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Range 54.2 30.0 29.3 30.5 31.2 148.2 115.7 115.0 119.5 116.8 
1st Quartile 8.7 4.9 6.8 3.6 3.6 15.3 7.5 6.6 7.0 4.6 
Median 12.9 8.3 11.6 6.5 8.1 26.5 22.6 17.3 21.2 17.4 
3rd Quartile 17.1 12.6 16.3 8.5 11.1 62.0 40.5 36.9 41.9 36.4 
Mean 14.3 9.1 12.4 6.9 7.8 38.8 28.5 25.9 26.9 23.5 
Variance (n) 83.8 33.4 43.4 20.6 29.2 1077.1 724.4 666.0 617.9 528.3 
Standard deviation (n) 9.2 5.8 6.6 4.5 5.4 32.8 26.9 25.8 24.9 23.0 
Variation coefficient 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 
 
Notes: a/ Variable codes used along the paper are constructed using a prefix plus a suffix.  Prefix "App_" stands for applied 
MFN, "Dif_" for difference between applied and bound.  Suffix refer to product groups: A for Non-fuel primary 
commodities; B for Resource-intensive manufactures; C for Low skill- and technology intensive manufactures; D for 
Medium skill- and technology intensive manufactures; E for High skill and technology intensive manufactures (see  
 
Table 1). All statistics are based on un-weighted average. 
 Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
Applied tariffs are usually more regularly distributed than the binding overhang.  The distribution of 
water is characterised by its concentration towards the lower end of the spectrum, together with a 
large variance of the observations.  Here again, agriculture is an extreme case; all remaining groups  
—the non agricultural products, or NAMA products— share apparently more or less the same 
distribution. 
The scatter-plot matrix (Figure 1) allows to visualize the individual and the joint distribution of 
applied tariff levels and tariff water, offering a fairly comprehensive view of the data. The diagonal 
shows the distribution histogram of each individual variable and complements the statistics presented 
in Table 2. Scatter-plots outside the diagonal illustrate, for each cell or "panel" formed by the 
intersection of a row and column, the bivariate relationship between the variables appearing on the 
horizontal and vertical axis. To facilitate the visualization of the bivariate relationship, a confidence 
interval ellipse is centred on the sample means of the respective variables. It indicates the sample 
covariance between the two variables (a measure of correlation) and its orientation. Highly correlated 
variables will exhibit an elongated ellipse along the first or second diagonal of the graph (positive or 
negative correlation). 
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Figure 1: Scatter-plot matrix of applied tariffs and difference 
 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
The histograms on the diagonal of the scatter-plot matrix show a clear distinction between the 
distribution of applied tariffs and water. The tariff waters share a common profile with a concentration 
of observations on low values and with a regular decrease of frequency when moving to higher values 
for the water. This patter is steeper for higher technology contents (categories D and E) and more 
diffuse and irregular for agriculture. Applied MFN show a wider difference in histograms, from log-
normal (groups A, B and D) or asymmetric (E) to a more normal distribution around the average (C). 
 
There is usually a strong bilateral interrelation between tariff waters, as shown by the elongated 
feature of the covariance ellipse. The relationship is strong for NAMA but, once again, water in 
agriculture is less closely related to water in other categories of goods (i.e., some countries may have 
high water for agriculture and low water for NAMA, or conversely). The relationship among applied 
tariffs is also present, albeit weaker, between B and the other NAMA categories C, D and E, and 
between D and E. The covariance between {C ; D}, and {C ; E} exists, but is weaker than for the 
other NAMA categories. As far as agriculture is concerned, no clear bivariate relationship appears 
from the graphs, as evidenced by the rounder ellipses. Similarly, there is no direct relationship 
between applied and differential tariffs. 
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The degree of similarity/dissimilarity among the product groups has been also be more formally 
measured by testing the following hypothesis: do the 5 product sectors belong to the same statistical 
population as far as the applied duties and water are concerned?  For the applied duties the hypothesis 
was rejected, confirming that each group receives a specific tariff treatment and validating that the 
five sectors can be considered as separate entities.  Even when the comparison is limited to NAMA 
groups (B, C, D and E), the hypothesis is rejected.   
 
The situation for the water is somehow similar as the hypothesis has been also rejected, but the risk of 
wrongly rejecting the hypothesis is about 0.2, while for the applied tariffs was almost nil. Moreover,  
when the sample is reduced to the three NAMA  groups B, C, E, the hypothesis of same origin is 
accepted: water is sufficiently similar across these three sub-group to consider them as homogeneous 
for this criteria.  
 
Thus, from an analytical perspective, applied tariffs and binding overhang seem to follow a different 
logic.  Agriculture follows a clearly specific internal logic (sui generis) in terms of applied duties and 
water.  Moreover, the MFN applied levels in the NAMA sector are clearly distinct but the water looks 
rather homogeneous across NAMA products. 
 
2. Geographical mapping of tariffs  
By categorizing tariffs (0 to 5%; between 5 and 15%; higher than 15%) and by colouring high values 
with dark colours, an illustration of the average applied tariffs in agriculture and in NAMA for the 
120 economies is provided in the world maps 1 and 2 respectively. 9  The word maps 3 and 4 provide 
an overview of the average tariff water for agricultural and NAMA products by using the same scale 
and colours. 
 
Countries seem to apply in average higher duties in agriculture than in NAMA, as shown in maps 1 
and 2.  For instance, in the Americas Mexico and Colombia look much darker in the agricultural 
sector, like Egypt in Africa and Norway, Switzerland and Iceland in Europe.  Similarly Japan in Asia, 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Middle East apply higher duties in agriculture and appear darker in map 
1.  Nevertheless, a few countries applying lower duties in agriculture can be identified like Rwanda 
and Burundi in Africa, as they appear lighter in the agriculture map. 
 
Globally, in agriculture the average applied duty is 14% and the water 39%;  in NAMA the 
corresponding values are 9% and 26% and as expected, are lower than in agriculture.  It has to be 
reminded that averages include AVEs which can fluctuate significantly from one year to another and 
the average NAMA water includes a high number of estimates for the unbound products.  10 
 
                                                     
9 NAMA products values are calculated by summing up sectors B, C, D and E.   
10 The NAMA groups, B, C, D and E include equivalent numbers of unbound products.   
  8
 
Map 1: Applied duties for agricultural products 
 
 
Note:  Economies with applied duties in average from 0 to 5% appear in white, between 5 and 15% in grey and higher than 
15% in black.  Crossed diagonals indicate that data are not available for the country. 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
Map 2: Applied duties for NAMA products 
 
 
Note:  Economies with applied duties in average from 0 to 5% appear in white, between 5 and 15% in grey and higher than 
15% in black.  Crossed diagonals indicate that data are not available for the country. 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
The visual exploration of the water in agriculture, see map 3, indicates that Latin America economies 
are characterised by deep water.   
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Map 3: Tariff water for agricultural products 
 
Note:  Economies with water in average from 0 to 5% appear in white, between 5 and 15% in grey and higher than 15% in 
black.  Crossed diagonals indicate that data are not available for the country. 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
Map 4: Tariff water for NAMA products  
 
Note:  Economies with water in average from 0 to 5% appear in white, between 5 and 15% in grey and higher than 15% in 
black.  Crossed diagonals indicate that data are not available for the country. 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
In most African and in some Asian countries, the margins in agriculture look also very high.  
Developed countries show rather low margins regardless their geographical location.   
 
For several countries, the tariff water in NAMA (map 4) is lower than in agriculture;  it is not the case 
for Australia, New Zealand and some African countries like Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, 
Sierra Leone, Angola, etc.  Apart from Latin American countries, there is no evidence that the water 
in developing countries is related to the geographical region. The visual exploration shows also the 
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diversity of situations regarding tariff schedules across countries and between agriculture and NAMA 
sectors.   
 
3. Tariffs by stages of processing 
Tariff policy is defined not only by the absolute level of market protection provided by applied and 
bound tariff, by also by the "effective protection" or "effective rate of assistance" provided by tariff 
escalation. Tariff escalation results in progressively higher import duties on semi-processed products 
than on raw materials, upwards to finished products. As mentioned by the Dictionary of Trade Policy 
Terms (Goode, 2003), this practice protects domestic processing industries and discourages the 
development of processing activity in the countries where the raw materials originate.  
 
The extend of tariff escalation is explored by classifying products according to their stages of 
processing, from raw (stage 1) to partially processed (stage 2) and processed (stage 3) and computing 
the corresponding indicators of applied MFN, bound tariffs and water. The results presented in , show 
a complex pattern of escalation within product groups A, B, C and D in terms of applied duties, and 
within product groups A, C and D in terms of bound duties. A de-escalation pattern is noticeable 
across product groups for both applied and bound tariffs as duties decrease with the complexity and 
intensity of factoring (or, conversely, increase with the intensity of low skilled labour). 11 This pattern 
is more consistent with the protection of domestic labour than the promotion of industrialization 
through effective assistance. It should also be noted than those patterns observed for the sample of 
120 members hide large variances across countries, and the coefficient of variation is always 
comprised between 0.7 and 1. 
 
As shown in the first panel of  Figure 2 within each of the NAMA product groups, applied tariffs tend 
to be higher for the processed products (stages 2 and 3) belonging to group C (low skill and low 
technology manufactures). These labour intensive products, such as textile and clothing, receive a 
more significant protection than other manufactures in terms of tariff escalation.  The tariff escalation 
pattern for bound averages is slightly different than for applied duties.  Within each product group, 
countries tend to protect more the processed products (process3) but unprocessed goods tend to be 
more protected than semi-processed. Group B –raw materials- makes the exception, as the bound 
protection is higher for un-processed products (stage 1).   
 
It should be also noted that the higher protection observed in panel 1 (applied tariffs) for labour 
intensive manufactures results more from an evolution of practices than an a priori policy, as the 
escalation graph for the bound tariffs (second panel) does not show significant differences between 
groups B, C and D.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 Comparing product groups, the relatively more technical intensive groups D and E have lower 
applied and bound tariffs than the other product groups; similarly, agriculture is always more protected than 
manufactured products. It should be noted that, when performing "within group" analysis, tariff escalation 
within the products "E" (high skill- and technology intensive manufactures) is not meaningful under the present 
classification in three stages, as this category includes practically no unprocessed articles. 
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Figure 2: Tariffs By Stage of Processing and Product Group, 2006  
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Notes: Three stages of processing, from low (Process 1) to high (Process 3). Product groups: A: Non-fuel primary 
commodities; B: Resource-intensive manufactures; C: Low skill and technology intensive manufactures; D: Medium skill 
and technology intensive manufactures; E: High skill and technology intensive manufactures. 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
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4. Looking for tariff policy patterns 
After this first examination of the data, the present section is using EDA techniques to identify 
potential underlying structures in the data.  The research is conducted in two directions: the variables 
(tariff duties) and the observations (countries).   Structuring the variable space means looking for 
common tariff patterns across countries, while studying the observation space provides information on 
economies, based on their use of applied tariffs and  binding overhang. 
     
(a) Cluster analysis of tariff variables 
The Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering (AHC) of tariff variables is straightforward, as showed in 
Figure 3, and confirms the initial results of previous sections;  the dendrogram  should be read 
bottom-up by considering that the most similar objects are paired first.  The tariff water presented at 
the left panel of the graph, clusters more rapidly than average tariffs, indicating more homogeneity 
than the applied MFN tariffs. 
 
Figure 3: Hierarchical clustering of tariff variables    
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Notes: a/ Product groups: A, Non-fuel primary commodities; B, Resource-intensive manufactures; C, Low skill- and 
technology intensive manufactures; D, Medium skill- and technology intensive manufactures; E, High skill- and technology 
intensive manufactures  
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
For both applied and water, agriculture stands out by its dissimilarity to other product groups.  Its 
specificity measured by the dissimilarity index on the graph, is larger in the "applied tariff" dimension 
than in the binding overhang.  Variables related to groups B, C and D are close in the water 
dimension, but less in the applied tariffs.  Group C of low skill manufactures (textiles and clothing) 
differs from the other NAMA products, in the applied tariffs dimension.   
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(b) Cluster analysis of the economies 
The analysis of the 120 "observations", included in our sample by visual examining a series of AHC 
experiments, indicated that countries could be "appropriately" grouped into 5 clusters (Figure 4).  12 
 
Figure 4: Hierarchical clustering of observations    
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Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
 
The composition of the 5 clusters is defined by using the K-means clustering.13 The classification as 
showed in Table 3, produces two large clusters, 1 and 2, including respectively 41 and 34 countries, 
and three medium sized clusters of about 15 economies.  Clusters 1 and 4 are the most "compact", 
with the lowest within-class variance.  Cluster 5 is the "loosest" one, with large within-class variance 
and high average distance to centroid.  In other words, the typical tariff profile of classes 1 and 4 is 
shared by most of its members, while the association of class 5 participants with a "typical pattern" is 
fuzzier.   
 
All clusters demonstrate relatively higher applied tariffs for group A (agriculture) and C (low 
skill/capital manufactures), although there is more dispersion concerning the treatment of agriculture.  
Product groups D and E (medium and high skill manufactures) tend to be generally less protected. 
 
                                                     
12 Appropriate means that this number provided for reasonably balanced sub-samples, while 
maintaining significant distances between each cluster.  As often in EDA, it was the result of a subjective 
judgement based on the interpretation of graphs.  The following sections will show that this decision can also be 
based on quantitative information criteria. 
13 The procedure divides the dataset by minimising the within-group sum of squared errors in terms of 
the Euclidean distance from the group centroid.  – i.e.  the mean of variables included in the cluster.  Because K-
means is sensitive to initial partitioning, 10 simulations were run using different random initial partitions, and 
the best case was selected on the basis of minimum within-class variance, i.e., the partition giving the most 
compact clustering. 
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Table 3: Classification of economies in five clusters. 
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1 41 
Albania,  Armenia,  Australia,  Botswana,  Côte d'Ivoire,  Cambia,  Canada,  China,  Congo,  Croatia,  Cuba, 
Ecuador,  EC,  FYROM Macedonia,  Gabon,  Georgia,  Guinea,  Hong-Kong,  Japan,  Jordan,  Korea Rep., 
Kyrgyz,  Macao,  Madagascar,  Mauritania,  Moldova,  Mongolia,  Namibia,  Nepal,  New Zealand,  Oman, 
Qatar,  Saudi Arabia,  Sing,  South Africa,  Swaziland,  Switzerland,  Taipei Chinese,  UAE,  USA,  Viet 
Nam. 325 
2 34 
Argentina,  Bahrain,  Venezuela,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Brunei,  C.  African Rep.,  Chile,  Costa Rica,  Djibouti, 
Dominican Rep.,  Egypt,  El Salvador,  Fiji,  Guatemala,  Guinea Bissau,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Indonesia, 
Maldives,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Papua NG,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines,  Senegal, 
Sierra Leone,  Sri Lanka,  Thailand,  Turkey,  Urugay. 564 
3 14 
Benin  Burkina Faso,  Burundi,  Colombia,  Iceland,  India,  Israel,  Malaysia,  Mali,  Myanmar,  Niger, 
Norway,  Tunisia,  Zimbabwe. 1079 
4 14 
Angola,  Antigua & Barbuda,  Belize,  Dominica,  Ghana,  Grenada,  Guyana,  Jamaica,  Malawi,  Pakistan, 
St.  Lucia,  St.  Vincent, Trinidad & Tobago,  Uganda. 456 
5 17 
Bangladesh,  Barbados,  Cameroon,  Chad,  Dem.  Rep.  Congo,  Kenya,  Kuwait,  Lesotho,  Mauritius, 
Mozambique,  Nigeria,  Rwanda,  St, Kitts & Nevis,  Solomon Isl.,  Tanzania,  Togo,  Zambia. 2434 
 
Note: Classification based on applied tariffs and binding overhang in the five product groups A to E (see  
 
Table 1).  The maximum distance to centroid indicates possible outliers. 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
 
When contrasted with other groups, cluster 1 is characterized by comparatively low values for applied 
tariffs and water for all product groups ( 
Table 4).  At the other extreme, cluster 5 is made of countries having both high applied tariffs in 
average (except in agriculture), and high binding overhangs.  Class 4 is somewhat similar to class 5 
albeit much more homogeneous, as seen above, but with lower values in both tariffs and waters.   
 
Table 4: Tariff profile of the five clusters 
Statistics:a Average Std.  Deviation Coefficient of variation 
Variables: Applied Water Applied Water Applied Water 
1 7.7 5.7 2.7 2.4 0.4 0.4 
2 10.5 24.4 3.1 1.2 0.3 0.0 
3 12.6 25.4 5.4 19.8 0.4 0.8 
4 10.8 51.2 3.3 11.5 0.3 0.2 
5 12.5 76.9 2.9 10.1 0.2 0.1 
 
Notes: a/ computed on the values of each class centroid for the five categories of products (A to E). 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
Compared with 4 and 5, clusters 2 and 3 shows similar high applied rates in all product groups, (and 
somewhat higher for agriculture) but lower water (except for agriculture).  The difference between 
clusters 2 and 3 themselves is more subtle, and relates mostly to the dispersion of the tariff water 
rather than the applied level.  Cluster 2 is characterized by more homogenous pattern of applied tariffs 
and water across the five product groups, while the third cluster shows higher variation, especially in 
tariff water.    
 
The last step of the EDA on the general tariff profiles applies a principal component analysis to the 
variables and observations.  Most of the variance (82%) is explained by the first two components 
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while the third explains only 8% of the variance.  The first factor (53% of total variance) organises the 
observations by the level of binding overhang (see Table 5) and the second by the applied tariffs for 
non agricultural goods.  Finally, the third dimension is determined by the level of applied tariffs in 
agriculture. Figure  Figure 5 provides a projection of the 120 observations on a two dimensional 
graph, defined by the first two components as axis, and with the third component indicated by the size 
of the point. 
 
Table 5: PCA factor loading 
 D1 D2 D3 
Applied: 
A 0.0 0.3 1.0 
B 0.2 0.9 0.2 
C 0.1 0.9 0.2 
D 0.1 1.0 0.1 
E 0.2 0.9 0.1 
Water: 
A 0.9 0.1 0.1 
B 1.0 0.1 0.0 
C 1.0 0.1 0.0 
D 1.0 0.2 0.0 
E 0.9 0.2 0.0 
 
Note: Factor loading after applying varimax rotation. 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
  
Figure 5: Principal Component Analysis of clusters 
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Notes: After varimax rotation.  The numbers refer to the clusters, the size of the bubble indicates the score on D3. 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO' tariff data. 
The ordering from left to right of the clusters according to their score in terms of binding overhang 
appears clearly on the graph.  At the contrary, the second dimension of NAMA applied tariffs, does 
not discriminate between clusters: for each cluster, there are observations scattered across a large 
range of applied tariffs.  The exception is cluster 4, which shows a clear concentration around the 
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average value.  It appears also that clusters 2 and 3 are overlapping and could be merged without 
loosing too much information, at least according to the two principal components. Observation 
scoring relatively high on D3 (high applied in agriculture) tend to agglomerate on low value of D1. 
From the projection, Djibouti appears as a clear outlier in the sample; at the contrary, Tanzania looks 
more as a extreme value for group 5, rather than a real outlier.14 Mauritius, Lesotho and Kuwait are 
exocentric with respect to group 5, which visibly has the highest within-group variance (Table 3).   
Finally, Norway stands out for its low tariffs in non-agricultural products (second axis) and its high 
level of agricultural protection (third factor, shown by the size of the point in the graph). 
 
 
B. TARIFFS BY SECTOR 
 
Moving from general to specific, in this section the applied tariffs and water are explored by product 
sector.  The research looks in every product sector for similarities and dissimilarities between the 
economies and investigates how the observations can be best regrouped (or split).   
 
At first, the most evocative results obtained with clustering techniques are presented.  Then, the 
negotiation margins are illustrated by following a simpler and more intuitive approach based on the 
relative position of each economy in relation to applied duties and water.   The results for only two 
products are presented in this paper: 
 
• group A -agricultural products-, for its specific role in partitioning the sample, and 
• group C -textiles and clothing-, a symbolic NAMA product. 
 
 
1. K-means cluster analysis for groups A and C  
The k-means cluster analysis method is used again to partition the observations.  The optimal number 
of clusters is defined on the basis of the Calinski - Harabasz pseudo-F index 15.  For group A and C 
the optimal number of clusters obtained is  two and seven (see also footnote 13).  16   
 
In figure 6 are projected the 120 economies' average values of applied duties (horizontal axis) and 
binding overhang (vertical axis) in the agricultural sector.  The cluster analysis regroups low overhang 
economies in cluster 1 and high overhang economies in cluster 2.  The applied tariffs factor does not 
discriminate between clusters.  It's worth mentioning that developed economies, with the exception of 
Iceland and Norway, are all included in cluster 1 which counts 80 economies. 
 
Extreme values lay at the top-left and bottom-right of the plot opposing Lesotho, Bangladesh, Nigeria 
and Mauritius to Tunisia, Egypt, Norway and Morocco.  Djibouti and Tanzania depicted as extreme 
values/ outliers in the previous section are now laying near to the centres of clusters 1 and 2 and have 
rather a 'normal' tariff profile in this sector.  Consequently, their agricultural tariff policy had to 
significant influence in their position in the global analysis. 
 
                                                     
14 Reprocessing the data without Djibouti did not change substantially the results. 
15 The larger the index, the better the partition provided by the corresponding number of clusters.  In 
the previous chapter, a more intuitive visual examination based on an initial hierarchical clustering was used to 
define this optimal number.  The present approach is more objective, and easier to apply when many sub-groups 
have to be treated successively. 
16 For the remaining product groups, the obtained optimal number of clusters was 5 for group B, 4 for 
group D , 8 for both E and F.   
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Figure 6: K-means cluster analysis for agricultural products, product group A 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO's tariff data. 
 
 
The scatter diagram for the textiles and clothing in figure 7, gives a different picture of the 120 
economies.  Many data points have moved to the centre of the diagram compared to agriculture.  The 
k-means cluster analysis regroups the data points into 7 clusters.   
 
The clusters are well balanced and include equivalent number of countries.  The smaller cluster is 
cluster 7, which includes only 7 economies and has the highest dispersion.  Again, the binding 
overhang is the factor that basically discriminate the economies and forms the clusters.    
 
Tanzania is an extreme value in this group of products, and has the highest overhang.  It is included in 
cluster number 7 together with Kuwait and Mauritius.  Djibouti, revealed as outlier in the global 
analysis shown in the previous section, lays at the bottom-right of the scatter together with Zimbabwe, 
Morocco and Viet Nam.  Lesotho, almost an outlier for agriculture, has a 'normal' profile for textiles 
and clothing, and belongs to cluster 3.  Norway has also a completely different behaviour in this 
product group, and is now part of cluster 1. 
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Figure 7: K-means cluster analysis for textiles and clothing, product group C 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
 
It is now clear that economies behave differently in their tariff policy according to the product sectors.  
In agriculture, economies with similar tariff policies form basically two groups; whereas in textiles 
and clothing sector, the situation is more complex: a larger variety of tariff policies is observed, 
leading to establish seven "policy" clusters. 
 
However, cluster analysis is a technique best used for dealing with multiple criteria; it is probably too 
sophisticated when dealing with only two dimensions, i.e.  applied and water for a single product 
group.  It is also sensitive to the presence of outliers.  The following section offers a more intuitive 
and robust approach. 
 
2. Illustrating the negotiation margins: groupings based on percentiles 
In this section a different way to regroup countries is proposed: straightforward categories based on 
applied duties and tariff water percentiles are used to partition the data points.  The 33rd and 66th 
percentiles 17 are used to regroup economies according to three categories (low / middle/ high) of 
applied duties and three categories (low / middle/ high) of binding overhang.  These 3x3 categories 
split the scatter diagram of the 120 economies in 9 distinct groups (table 6) for every product group.   
 
  
 
                                                     
17 Defined as the values below which stand 33% and 66% of all observations, respectively. 
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Table 6. Visual presentation of the percentile approach  
 
 
Group 1 includes very open economies applying 
relatively low duties (below the 33rd percentile of 
applied duties of the sample) and having very shallow 
water (below the 33rd percentile of the binding 
overhang of the sample).  Conversely, group 9 
gathers very protectionist economies with very high 
applied duties (above the 66th  percentile of applied 
duties of the sample) and very high margins (above 
the 66th of the binding overhang of the sample).  
Compared to cluster analysis, where groupings are 
based on abstract topological considerations, the 
percentile approach provides a more intuitive 
interpretation of the groupings and allows a cross-
products / cross-countries comparison. 
  
Table 7 shows the 9 percentile classes for agriculture.  Classes 1 and 2 include the majority of 
developed countries and confirm, for example, the openness of the USA, Australia and New Zealand 
markets in the agricultural sector.  EC and Canada are included in the second group as they apply in 
average, higher duties in agriculture than Class1 countries.  It's interesting to observe that among 
developed countries the most protective in agriculture are Japan and Switzerland (class 3).   
Table 7: The percentiles approach in product group A (Agriculture) - the composition of classes 
  Members of the class Number 
CLASS 1 
Albania, Armenia, Australia, Croatia, Cuba, Haiti, Hong-Kong China, Kyrgyz Rep., Macao China, Moldova, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States 
17 
CLASS 2 
Côte d'Ivoire, Canada, China, Ecuador, European Communities, FYROM Macedonia, Georgia, Madagascar, 
Panama, Peru, Senegal, Chinese Taipei 
12 
CLASS 3 
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo, Japan, Jordan, Korea Rep., Morocco, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Turkey, Viet Nam 11 
CLASS 4 
Argentina, Bahrain, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippine, Singapore, South Africa, Swaziland, Uruguay 
17 
CLASS 5 
Angola, Benin, Venezuela, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Mauritania, Nepal, Sierra Leone 
13 
CLASS 6 Djibouti, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, Israel, Maldives, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Tunisia 10 
CLASS 7 Burundi, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar 6 
CLASS 8 
Antigua and Barbuda, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Dem.  Rep.  of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Rwanda, St.  Kitts and Nevis, St.  Lucia, St.  Vincent and Grenadines, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago 
15 
CLASS 9 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Cameroon, Chad, Dominica, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Iceland, India, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Norway, Solomon Isl., Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
19 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
 
It is also interesting to notice that Madagascar and Senegal are part of class 2, with very low water.  
The majority of developing countries are expected to be included in upper groups, where margins are 
higher.  What is most probably unexpected is to find in the class 9 of very protective economies with 
very high margins Iceland, India and Norway.  In the textiles and clothing sector, the majority of 
developed countries are, as expected, in class 1, except Australia and New Zealand which are in class 
4.  Class 1 is the most numerous and also includes many developing countries.  18  
 
 
                                                     
18 Albeit the uni-dimensional clustering is done using percentiles and is by definition balanced, the 
intersection of two uni-dimensional clusters needs not to be balanced (indeed, the intersection can be empty). 
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Table 8:  The percentiles approach in product group C (Textiles and Clothing)- the composition of classes 
  Members of the class number 
CLASS1 
Armenia, Canada, Croatia, European Communities, Georgia, Hong-Kong China, Iceland, Japan, Korea Rep., 
Kyrgyz Rep., Macao China, Moldova, Norway, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, 
United States 19 
CLASS2 Albania, Cambodia, China, Cuba, FYROM Macedonia, Guinea, Jordan, Malaysia, Mauritania 9 
CLASS3 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo, Gabon, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Viet Nam 
12 
CLASS4 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Haiti, Israel, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Qatar, Turkey, United Arab Emirates 
13 
CLASS5 
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Honduras, Indonesia, Madagascar, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Uruguay 11 
CLASS6 
Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Central African Republic, Colombia, Djibouti, Egypt, India, Maldives, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Tunisia 
16 
CLASS7 Angola, Bahrain, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago 8 
CLASS8 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Dem.  Rep.  of Congo, Dominica, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, St.  Kitts and Nevis, St.  Lucia, St.  Vincent and Grenadines, Solomon Isl.. 16 
CLASS9 
Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 16 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
It's worth mention that some Least Developed Countries (LDC) appear in classes 2 and 3 - like Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Guinea, Mali and Mauritania-, an unexpected result considering 
that these classes have very shallow water.  This tends to indicate that tariff policies are not always 
directly related to the development factor, an hypothesis that will be further tested in the next section 
of the paper.   
3. Negotiation margins: A cross-country and cross-product comparison 
The percentiles approach divides in every sector the data points into 9 groups and consequently allows a 
cross-product / cross-countries comparison.   
 
Table 9 shows the results for selected countries (all developed economies and selected CIS, 
developing countries and LDCs).  For each country and group of product the applied duties (high, 
middle and low) are illustrated with colours (black, grey and white) and the water (large, middle and 
low) with waves (≈,∼, ). 
Developed countries are expected to naturally have low values in the water and therefore to be 
included in classes 1, 2 and 3.  Conversely, LDCs are expected to have high values in the water and to 
a certain extent be included in classes 7, 8 and 9. 
Surprisingly some of the developed countries have high applied duties (coloured black or grey) for 
some products –agriculture, textiles and clothing, pharmaceuticals- and have even high water (two 
waves).  CIS countries show a 'developed economy' profile and appear as open as developed countries 
without benefiting from water in their tariffs. 
In the other extreme, LDCs at the bottom-left of table 9 show a variety of profiles but globally apply 
high duties (with some exceptions) and do not always benefit from high margins in the binding 
overhang. 
Developing countries, in the right part of  
 
Table 9, have very different types of profiles, from  'developed country' profiles —Albania,  Croatia, 
Hong-Kong China, Macao China, Singapore etc.—  to  'LDC country' profiles —Antigua and 
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Barbuda, Bolivia, Dominica, Nigeria, St.  Kitts and Nevis, St.  Lucia, St.  Vincent, Barbados, Belize, 
Grenada, Guyana, Kenya, Pakistan, Cameroon, Ghana and Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Table 9: Negotiation margins for selected countries by product group 
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Note: The level of applied duties, high, middle and low, are illustrated with black, grey and white and the level of water, 
large, middle and low, with waves (≈,∼, ). 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
IV. EXPLORING THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC PATTERNS 
This inventory of selected economies so called "negotiation margins" presented in the previous 
section tends to indicate that the variety of tariff policies followed by the countries are rather product-
specific, and only loosely related to the economic development dimension. The present sections 
explore more thoroughly the relationship between trade policy and economic factors. Two 
complementary analyses are undertaken: the relationship between socio-economic variables and 
tariffs is explored initially at the product group level and then at the global level. Lastly, the socio-
economic variables are used to determine the tariff policy and therefore, endorse any obtained 
analytical conclusions.   
 
A. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA 
A series of structural socio-economic variables and macroeconomic indicators are associated to the 
initial tariff indicators including the size of the economy in terms of population and GDP, the average 
per capita income, and the source of value added (agriculture, industry, services).  Trade indicators 
cover openness, the relative share of trade in goods and services, and the main categories of imports 
and exports of merchandises (food, fuels and manufactures).  Macroeconomic variables include 
inflation, current account balance, government expenditure and taxes.  Other qualitative variables 
influencing the trade negotiations, such as the date of WTO membership, the level of development 
and the geographical location are also added.  In total, 75 socio-economic variables are included.  
Most of the quantitative variables are grouped in a triplet including the 1995 and the 2006 levels, the 
variation from 1995 to 2000, and from 2000 to 2006. The socio-economic data are sourced from the 
World Bank 's World Development Indicators.   
 
 
1. Exploring the socio-economic variables 
Many of the socio-economic variables exhibit strong co-linearity, either because the indicators are 
partially redundant or because they are linked through a functional relationship..  Principal component 
analysis is applied to the initial dataset to reduce multi co-linearity and isolate, out of the 74 variables, 
the relevant variables to be retained. In order to avoid endogeneity issues, variables in level are 
measured in 1995, at the conclusion of the UR that fixed the bound tariffs, and values for 2006 are 
reflected through two sets of rates of growth (from 1995 to 2000, and from 2000 to 2006).  A second 
analysis is performed with the 2006 level, in order to check the robustness of results (results did not 
differ substantially, except for the ordering of the components). 
 
The first result is disappointing as no clear pattern can be established in the extended dataset.  The 
main component, supposed to capture most of the information, explains less than 10% of the total 
variance.  Any conclusion or interpretation of the results would have a very weak explanatory power: 
the four major principal components accounted for only 30% of the variance, and one would have to 
include up to 22 dimensions to explain at least 80% of the total variance.   
With these caveats in mind, the socio-economic data set is structured by the following factors: (1) 
overall economic development dimension,  (2) small oil and service oriented economies; (3) trade 
openness and macroeconomic variables. 
• The first component F1 explains 10% of total variance. It is associated with rural countries on 
its positive segment, with a high share of agriculture in GDP, and low manufacturing and 
services contribution. This rural orientation remains extensive, with a low use of fertilizers: 
those are predominantly poor countries, as measured by the per capita income, and have a 
high population growth and a high share of food imports and fuel imports; They are 
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characterized by a high weight of inelastic imports, corresponding to a low share of 
manufactures in the imports. The governmental consumption has also a low incidence in 
GDP. As for their external sector, the countries with high scores for this dimension were 
highly indebted countries in 1995, but experienced a rapid decrease of their external 
indebtedness between 2000 and 2006. Because their large current account deficit has not 
improved markedly during the period, the reduction in external debt may be due to the impact 
of official assistance, such as the initiatives adopted in the framework of the Millennium 
Development Goals. Their exports are mainly agricultural products and low in manufactures. 
This dimension is closely associated with high levels of applied MFN (except in agriculture) 
and deep water (Table 10). Sub-Saharan Africa, as a region, is closely associated with 
positive values of F1. 
 
•  Countries with a high score for the second component F2 (capturing 8% of total variance) are 
associated with high inflation levels over the entire period, albeit decreasing between 2000 
and 2006. They also tend to have high military spending in 1995, decreasing between 1995 
and 2000. The share of industries predominantly extractive, representing in 1995 a large 
proportion of GDP, has  further increased between 1995 and 2000. Correspondingly, the share 
of services in the economy has decreased markedly since 1995, and particularly between 1995 
and 2000. Albeit a low share of agriculture in GDP in 1995, it has increased during the 
reporting period. This latter characteristic is not found in other components. Their external 
sector dominated by exports of fuels, has strengthened their current account position between 
1995 and 2000. Despite registering no particular current account deficit in the base year, these 
countries had accumulated an important stock of external debts. Indebtedness decreased 
quickly between 1995-2000 and also, but less so, after 2000. Regional specificities are rather 
diffuse: Middle-East and African countries tend to be somewhat associated with the positive 
segment of F2, while CIS countries are closer to the negative values.   
 
• The contribution of the two other axes in explaining the data structure is even lower (about 
6% of total variance for each component) but reveals some additional discriminating factors.  
F3 shares some of the characteristics of F2 in the macroeconomic side (like high inflation) but 
is defined by larger countries (in population and total GDP), slightly poorer than the average 
in 1995 but which registered a high increase in the income per capita over the entire 1995-
2006 period. The countries ranking high on this component tend to have a low participation of 
services in GDP, and no particular specialization in agriculture or in manufactures, at the 
difference of F1 (agriculture) and F2 (extractive industries) countries. External sector 
variables indicate that high scores on F3 are associated with relatively closed economies, with 
low trade coefficients in goods and, particularly, in services. They also register low values of 
foreign direct investment, which further decreased after 2000. F4 countries tend to suffer from 
moderate inflation, slowing down after 2000. At the difference of F3, those are small 
countries in terms of population and GDP. Despite some increase in the share of rural 
population, these countries show a sharp reduction in both demographic growth and share of 
agriculture in GDP, especially after 2000. Open to trade, they received high FDI flows. CIS 
countries tend to be associated with high scores on F4. No specific regional pattern has been 
identified for F3.  
 
 
  
2. Associating tariff policy and socio-economic variables 
 
(a) EDA on tariffs and socio-economic data sets. 
The exploratory procedure combines the results of the tariff policy exploration (applied tariffs and 
water, clusters and scores) to the principal component analysis applied to the socio-economic 
variables.  The additional variables are simply projected on the resulting principal components, but do 
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not interact with their computation.  Thus these components are strictly determined by the socio-
economic variables, as described in the previous section.   
 
(i) Tariff by products and socio economic variables 
At first, the applied tariffs and water for each product group are included as additional variables in the 
socio-economic Principal Component Analysis.  As shown in Table 10, the only clear relation 
between tariff indicators (excluding agriculture) and socio-economic variables is the level of 
development, measured by the first component F1.  But this remains a loose relationship as F1 
explains only 10 per cent of the total variance.  In addition, the correlation of NAMA tariff variables 
with the development variable F1 remains low (between 0.3 and 0.6).  In addition, this closer 
relationship is limited to the applied level, and no strong systematic link exists between water and 
development.  Finally, agriculture behave differently from the other product groups. 
 
Table 10: Tariff variables and Socio-Economic Principal Components 
(percentages and correlation coefficients) 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 
Variability (%) 9.9 8.4 6.3 5.6 
Cumulative (%) 9.9 18.4 24.6 30.2 
Factor loading:      
App_A -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 
App_B 0.5 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
App_C 0.5 0 0 -0.3 
App_D 0.4 0 -0.1 -0.2 
App_E 0.6 0 -0.2 -0.2 
Diff_A 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0 
Diff_B 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
Diff_C 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
Diff_D 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
Diff_E 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
 
Notes: F1 to F4 are the four principal components extracted from socio-economic variables; applied tariffs and differences 
appear as supplementary variables. Factor loadings are similar to correlation coefficients in a normalized PCA. 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data. 
 
The second socio-economic factor, F2 explaining 8% of total socio-economic variance, differentiates 
oil exporters from the other economies.  Its impact on tariff structure is almost nil, as it is also the case 
for the remaining two principal components F3 and F4.   
 
(ii) Overall tariff pattern and socio-economic variables 
The previous section explored the relationship between socio-economic structure and tariffs for each 
individual product group. But a country's trade policy is defined by considering the entirety of 
products. This holistic approach led to 5 tariff policy clusters, as seen in previous sections of this 
paper. The relationship between these 5 clusters and the principal components representing the socio-
economic variables is even more diffuse than for the product groups, with a  correlation between 0 
and 0.3 in absolute value (Table 11).  Therefore, no clear and strong relationship can be identified 
between the overall tariff policy and broad socio-economic variables.  
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Table 11: Tariff policy clusters and Socio-Economic Principal Components 
(percentages and correlation coefficients) 
 
 PCA on Tariffs: Tariff Policy Clusters: 
Factors: D1 D2 D3 1 2 3 4 5 
F1 0.3 0.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 
F2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
F3 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
F4 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 
Selected variables:         
Fertilizers 2006 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 
GNI per cap. 1995 -0.1 -0.5 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 
Trade services/GDP1995 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 
Export Food 1995 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0 
Agricultural GDP 1995 0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Ext. Debt 1995 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 
Manufacture GDP 1995 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 
Notes: F1 to F4 are the four principal components extracted from socio-economic variables; applied tariffs and differences 
appear as supplementary variables. Factor loadings are similar to correlation coefficients in a normalized PCA. 
Source: Annex 1. 
 
The strongest relationship observed between clusters and individual socio-economic variables never 
exceeds 0.5 in absolute value (Annex 1). In addition, the robustness of the results was checked by 
substituting the 1995 levels by the final 2006 levels, endorsing the weakness of the conclusions: we 
are more in a situation of nuances than of contrasts. With these caveats in mind, the few significant 
relations between tariff policy clusters and socio-economic variables that can be mentioned refer to 
Cluster 1. This subset consists of economies with low applied duties and water in all products, and 
regroups recently acceded WTO members and developed countries characterized by a urban 
population, mature demography, low inflation, a high per capita GNI and a low weight of agriculture 
in both production and trade. Even though no clear-cut regional identification can be associated, these 
countries are mainly located in Europe, including the CIS.  
 
Characterizing other clusters is much more tentative. Cluster 2 is somehow symmetric to cluster 1 
from the socio-economic variables perspective; the correlation between the two clusters is -0.5. It 
contains relatively poor countries, with low incidence of public services, located in Latin America or 
the Caribbean. Cluster 3 economies distinguish themselves from the previous cluster countries for 
their higher governmental consumption, an increase of agriculture share in GDP and more intensive 
use of fertilizers.  This is the only cluster  associated with high applied tariffs in agriculture.  Cluster 4 
economies having high tariffs and deep water in both agriculture and NAMA, appear to be relatively 
poor rural developing countries, mainly food exporters suffering from inflation and external debt.  
These economies have nevertheless benefited from FDI flows. Cluster 5 economies are also poor 
countries, predominantly rural and very similar to cluster 4 economies with high water in both 
agricultural and NAMA sectors.  They are still far from achieving demographic maturity, with high 
population growth and have benefited from a reduction in their external debt. 
 
Once again, these correlations are weak, and do not define clear-cut socio-economic pattern. It is clear 
that the national socio-economic dimensions captured by the principal components do not improve 
significantly our understanding of national tariff policies.  But, as often in statistics, the null 
hypothesis is not deprived of significance and despite the apparent weak outcome, this is an important 
result.  There is no over-determination on the overall tariff policy by broad economic considerations: 
the decision-making process governing the definition of national tariff policy is the result of more 
complex interactions.   
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(b) Discriminating tariff patterns by using economic variables 
The final step of the analysis consists in investigating whether socio-economic variables, despite the 
low individual correlation observed in the previous sections, can still reliably determine the five tariff 
policy profiles.  As a first step, a discriminant analysis investigates for each country, if its initial 
clustering (based on purely tariff information) could have been inferred on the basis of socio-
economic data.  The confusion matrix, obtained by comparing the prior classification (initial clusters 
built on purely tariff data) to the results deduced from the socio-economic variables, provides some 
interesting information, especially on countries where the classification based on tariff structure 
appears unusual considering the economic situation.  
 
Table 12: Confusion matrix for the five clusters (discriminant analysis based on socio-economic 
variables)  
1.  Full sample 
from \ to 1 2 3 4 5 Total % correct 
1 32 1 1 0 0 34 94.1% 
2 0 30 0 0 1 31 96.8% 
3 1 1 9 0 1 12 75.0% 
4 0 1 1 11 0 13 84.6% 
5 1 0 0 0 13 14 92.9% 
Total 34 33 11 11 15 104 91.3% 
2.  Cross validation 
from \ to 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
% 
correct 
1 25 3 4 0 2 34 73.5% 
2 0 26 2 2 1 31 83.9% 
3 2 3 7 0 0 12 58.3% 
4 0 3 2 8 0 13 61.5% 
5 2 2 2 1 7 14 50.0% 
Total 29 37 17 11 10 104 70.2% 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
Overall, most countries are found to be properly classified in the 5 clusters, except for cluster 3 where 
25% of the countries seem misplaced according to their socio-economic characteristics (see part 1 of 
table 8). 
 
To cross validate the results and verify the robustness of the initial classification, each country has 
been re-classified, after removing it from the sample (see part 2 of Table 12). Thanks to this 
"jacknifing" process, the discriminant function is computed independently of the particular country 
being classified. 19 The difference between the full sample analysis results and the cross validation 
results is inversely dependent on the size of the sample and the degree of the relationship: small size 
clusters or weak relationships result in large differences. 
 
Surprisingly, cluster 1 —the largest one and the most closely associated to the principal dimensions of 
the socio-economic data— reports 74% of correct assignments compared to 94% in the full sample 
analysis. The difference of 20 percentage points indicates the wide variance of socio-economic 
                                                     
19 The general idea behind jacknifing in statistics lies in systematically recalculating the estimates 
leaving out one observation at a time from the sample set; the method is normally used to estimate the sampling 
distribution of a statistic. It was used here with the purpose of deriving more robust estimates of the discriminant 
function. 
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characteristics that exist in this cluster, including the recently acceded members to the WTO. Cluster 2 
appear to be the most robust with 84% of correct assignments. 
  
The remaining smaller size clusters (less than 15 observations), are more vulnerable to the validation 
procedure.  Cluster 5 is also the loosest one, as only half of its members are correctly classified 
according to the validation procedure.  Cluster 5 looks more like a residual grouping of very different 
data points sharing a few common features (in particular, a low development level).  An interesting 
feature of cluster 3 is that all reassigned countries went to clusters 1 and 2; cluster 3 mainly includes 
developed countries with relatively protectionist tariff policies.   
 
When looking at individual economies, in the group of developed countries Norway and Iceland are 
reassigned from Cluster 3 to 1, Japan and Korea from 1 to 2.  On the side of developing countries, 
Kuwait and unexpectedly Bangladesh move from Cluster 5 to 1 and Guyana from 4 to 2.  Moves from 
3 to 2 relates to relatively advanced developing countries such as Colombia or Tunisia.  On the other 
hand, Gabon and Madagascar are reclassified from 1 to 3 and Botswana, South Africa from 1 to 5 (the 
re-assignation of SSA to the 5th cluster is nevertheless loose, as the discriminant function identified a 
25% probability of pertaining to group 1).  China and Guinea move from 1 to 3, and Nicaragua from 2 
to 4. 
 
Additional explorations incorporated the regional dimension.  Geographical variables improve the 
direct classification, but deteriorate the cross-validation results and show that regional groupings are 
poor predictors of tariff patterns.  This result (not shown here) was already perceptible earlier in the 
study, when looking at the large differences across patterns in maps 1 to 4.   
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In the present study 120 economies are analysed in the basis of their applied duties and binding 
overhang; the main purpose is to illustrate the margins that economies, under WTO rules, are allowed 
to use unilaterally at the MFN level, and to identify and understand potential interactions determining 
tariff policies.  The analysis, which proceeds from general to specific, applies exploratory data 
analysis to identify underlying patterns behind the data, without any pretence at identifying the 
rational behind the observed structure. Five broad clusters of countries are determined on the basis of 
their tariff policy, and the relationship between this classification and socio-economic structures is 
analysed. 
 
A first element of conclusion is that tariff policies seem to protect more the labour intensive sectors, 
with some variations in the case of agriculture, rather than pursuing traditional protectionist industrial 
policies through "effective protection".  A second element of conclusion is that in tariff policies, the 
distinction between developing and developed countries is broadly relevant, but not overly 
determinant.  For example, while the extreme clusters 4 and 5 are constituted of developing countries, 
there is a mixture of developed and developing economies in all remaining clusters.  A third 
conclusion is that agricultural tariff policy becomes a strong discriminating factor across countries as 
soon as other variables, such as the level of development level, are taken into consideration.   
 
When the product sectors are considered independently, economies seem to follow different tariff 
strategies to protect their products.  Globally and for the majority of countries, the agricultural sector 
is more protected than the NAMA in terms of applied duties and water, while textiles and clothing is 
the most protected NAMA sector.  For a given country, the tariff structure varies across sectors.  Even 
if developed economies tend to share more common features than developing ones, no clear 
relationship can be established between the level of development and the overall tariff structure.   
 
From the negotiation margins perspective, developing countries that have joined the WTO recently 
faced stricter negotiations with their partners resulting in relatively low applied duties and water; as a 
result, these countries, like the developed economies, have a reduced negotiation margins in almost all 
sectors.   
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On the other side of the spectrum, high negotiation margins are not a privilege for LDCs; some 
developing and developed countries benefit from deep water in some sectors.  Unexpectedly, some 
LDCs show very small negotiation margins as they apply low duties and have only shallow water in 
some of the product sectors.  On the other hand, some developed countries make use of high applied 
duties in addition to deep water in agriculture.  Globally, applied tariffs and water respond to a 
different logic. 
 
By exploring the relationship between the tariff policy and the socio-economic dimensions, the only 
clear relation which emerged for individual product groups (excluding agriculture) is the level of 
development.  Specifically, in the NAMA sector, the applied tariffs for raw materials and 
pharmaceutical/hi-tech products are highly correlated to the level of development.  However, the 
relationship remains limited to the level of the applied tariffs; no strong systematic link has been 
identified between the water and the socio-economic dimension.  Agriculture behaves also differently 
from other product groups and its level of protection seems not related to the level of development.   
 
The relationship between the overall tariff policy (considering all product groups together) and the 
socio-economic variables is even more diffuse, and no strong relationship emerges between tariff 
policy clusters and the socio-economic context.  Consequently, we can conclude that trade policy is 
not over-determined by economic considerations: the decision-making process defining a precise 
trade policy is the result of more complex interactions. 
 
At last, discriminant analysis is used to validate the robustness of the clustering results and 
investigates to what extend the belonging of countries to a tariff policy cluster could be predicted 
based only on their socio-economic profile.  The first and most numerous cluster of low protection 
economies with shallow water, is particularly affected as many countries are reclassified in other 
clusters.  This indicates the wide variance of socio-economic conditions within the cluster, but also 
the bias created by the countries of recent accession to the WTO, with a tariff structure resulting from 
strict bilateral negotiations rather than socio-economic factors. Conversely, a few industrialised 
countries show a wider than expected dispersion of their tariff in relation to their development status.  
 
It is often believed that national trade policies are largely determined by socio-economic concerns, 
and that structural factors and factor endowments, which orient the productive specialisation of 
economies should determine the position of each country in the negotiation, as well as its propensity 
in entering into strategic coalitions.  By showing that actual tariff structures are only loosely 
determined by such structural factors, our results do not support these premises.   
 
*                  * 
* 
 
 
  29
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bchir M.  H., Jean S.  and Laborde D.  (2005), " Binding overhang and tariff cutting formulas". CEPII 
2005-18. 
Costantini V., Crescenzi R., De Filippis F.  and Salvatici L.  (2007), "Bargaining Coalitions in the 
WTO Agricultural Negotiations". The World Economy pp. 863891. 
Decreux Y.  and Fontagné L., (2009), " Economic impact of potential outcome of the DDA". CEPII 
2009-01. 
Foletti L., Fugazza M., Nicita A.  and Olarreaga M.  (2009) "Smoke in the Water". World Bank, 
Policy Research Working Paper 5050. 
Fontagné L., Guérin J-L.  and Jean S.  (2005), " Market Access Liberalisation in the Doha Round: 
Scenarios and Assessment". Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005, p. 1073-1094. 
François F.  and Martin W.  (2004),"Commercial policy variability, bindings, and market access". 
European Economic Review 48 (2004) 665-679. 
François F., Martin W.  and Manole V.  (2005),"Choosing Formulas for Market Access Negotiations: 
Efficiency and Market Access Considerations" World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
Series number 3474. 
Francois J., Van Meijl H., Van Tongeren F (2003), " Trade Liberalization and Developing Countries 
under the Doha Round". Tinbergen Institute TI 2003-060/2. 
Gibson P., Wainio J., Whitley D., And Bohan M.  (2001), "Profiles of tariffs in global agricultural 
markets". Agricultural Economic Report No. (aer796) 44 pp, January 2001. 
Goode W.  (2003), Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, Fourth Edition. 
Jones K.  (2007), "Regionalism and the problem of representation in the WTO". UNU-CRIS Working 
Papers W-2007/12. 
World Bank - World Development Indicators (on-line data base, data extracted in July 2009). 
WTO - Integrated Data Base, Consolidated Tariff Schedules database (on-line data bases, extracted in 
February 2008) 
WTO - UNCTAD -  ITC (2006) World Tariff Profiles. 
  30
 
VI. ANNEXES 
A. ANNEX 1: CORRELATION TABLE BETWEEN SELECTED VARIABLES AND PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS. 
 PCA on Tariffs: PCA on Socio-economic data: Tariff Policy Clusters: Regions: Recent accession 
Variables or components D1 D2 D3 F1 F2 F3 F4 1 2 3 4 5 ASPA CIS EUR LAC MENA NAM SSA RAM-0 RAM-1 
Inflation (2000) 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.2 
Inflation (2006) 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
dInflation(2000-2006) -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 
FDI (1995) 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
dFDI (2000-2006) 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 
Military 1995 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.2 
dMilitary(1995-2000) -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.2 
Population 1995 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
dPopulation (1995-2000) 0.3 0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.1 -0.1 
dPopulation (2000-2006) 0.3 0.4 -0.2 0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.6 0.1 -0.1 
Rural 1995 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.7 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.1 0.1 
Trade/GDP 1995 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.4 0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
Current Balance 1995 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 
dCurrent Bal (1995-2000) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 
Fertilizers 2006 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 
GNI per cap. 1995 -0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.8 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.2 
dGNI/H (2000-2006) -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 
d2GNI/H (1995-2006) 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.1 
Gov. Consumption 1995 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
Food imports 1995 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.6 -0.1 -0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.2 
Manufacture imports 1995 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 
Trade goods/GDP1995 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.5 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Trade services/GDP1995 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.6 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
Export Food 1995 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
Export Fuels 1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2 
Export manuf. 1995 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.6 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0 
Agricultural GDP 1995 0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.8 -0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.2 
dAg-GDP (1995-2000) 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.3 
Ext. Debt 1995 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.6 0.4 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 
dExt. Debt (1995-2000) -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
dExt. Debt (2000-2006) -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 
Industrial GDP 1995 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
dIndustrial GDP (1995-2000) -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.2 
Manuf. GDP 1995 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 
Service GDP 1995 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.2 
dServiceGDP (1995-2000) 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 
 
Note: Correlation coefficients, except for the "D" and "F" PCA components: Factor loading.  
Sources: Authors' calculation on the basis of WTO tariff data and World Bank's  World Development Indicators.  
 
